GERTRUDE TORKORNOO LAWFULLY REMOVED AS CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT OF GHANA
MRS. GERTRUDE TORKORNOO WAS LAWFULLY REMOVED AS CHIEF JUSTICE AND A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GHANA.
BY MARTIN A. B. K. AMIDU
Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo who was removed from office as the Chief Justice of Ghana on 1 September 2025 for stated misbehaviour pursuant to the mandatory recommendation of the Committee appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State to inquire into one of the petitions for her removal from office is so enamoured with the title and name of Her ladyship Justice Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo that she is moving heaven and earth to remain on the bench as Justice of the Supreme Court or superior court despite the plain and unambiguous meaning of Articles 146 of the 1992 Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey [2005-2006] SCGLR 732.
On 17 September 2025, Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo despite the binding decision of the Supreme Court in Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey applied to the High Court for judicial review on the grounds of “illegality and want of power under Article 146 of the Constitution under which the President executed the warrant of September 1st, 2025” and “lack of jurisdiction in the Article 146 Committee set up by the President to recommend removal of Chief Justice to recommend removal of a Justice of the Superior Court from office”.
The pith of Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo’s case as deposed to in paragraphs 17 to 21 of her affidavit in support of her application to the High Court contradicts the binding decisions of the Supreme Court in the Agyei Twum case when she states on oath as follows:
“17. That accordingly, and respectfully, the President did not have the power to remove me as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana on account of lack of consideration of a petition to remove me from office as a justice of the Superior Courts, lack of jurisdiction in the committee, and lack of a process for my removal from office as a Justice of the Superior Courts.
18. That it is clear that the process for appointing a Justice of the Supreme Court is different from the process for appointing a Chief Justice.
19. That further, the Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary responsible for the administration of the Judiciary, a function not performed by other Justices of the Supreme Court. Thus, removal as a Chief Justice does not imply automatic removal as a Justice of the Superior Court which includes the Supreme Court.
20. That by purporting to remove me from office both as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana and as a Chief Justice by Warrant dated September 1, 2025, the President acted contrary to, and in excess of the powers conferred on him by article 146 of the Constitution.
21. That the Warrant dated September 1, 2025 is thus illegal, null, void and of no effect, particularly as it seeks to remove me both as Chief Justice and as a Justice of the Supreme Court.”
Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo has since the petitions were made to the President to remove her from office demonstrated through legal actions commenced and lost from the High Court to the Supreme Court by surrogates and herself that she lacks the comportment and decorum of a Justice of the Superior Courts and a Chief Justice of Ghana as her application to the High Court which is the subject matter of this discourse will demonstrate in due course in an examination and analysis of the Supreme Court case of Agyei Twum.
The burden of the Supreme Court in the Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey case was to determine whether the President could appoint a committee to inquire into the complaints for the removal of the Chief Justice upon the mere presentation of a petition to him pursuant to Article 146 (6) of the Constitution without a prior determination of a prima facie case as was the case for the removal of superior court justices under Article 146 (1) of the 1992 Constitution.
Article 146 of the Constitution contained only one provision for the removal of a Justice of the Superior Court or a Chairman of a Regional Tribunal. All Justices of the Superior Courts, including the Chief Justice, could only be removed “for stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on grounds of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind.” Article 146 (3) then provides that:
“If the President receives a petition for the removal of a Justice of a Superior Court other than the Chief Justice or for the removal of the Chairman of a Regional Tribunal, he shall refer the petition to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether there is a prima facie case.” (Emphasis supplied).
Clause 6 of Article 146 dealing with a petition for the removal of the Chief Justice did not contain a requirement for the prior determination of a prima facie case. It states as follows:
“(6) Where the petition is for the removal of the Chief Justice, the President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint a committee consisting of two Justice of the Supreme Court, one of whom shall be appointed chairman by the President, and three other persons who are not members of the Council of State, nor members of Parliament, nor lawyers.”
The issue, therefore, arose in the Agyei Twum case whether in the case of a petition to remove the Chief Justice the President could constitutionally appoint a committee in consultation with the Council of State without a prior determination whether there is a prima facie case. Another issue arising in the Agyei Twum case for determination by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative acts of the Chief Justice are immune from the impeachment process.
On the issue of the prior requirement of the existence of a prima facie case under Article 146(6) the court decided that:
“A comparative examination of the relevant provisions dealing with petitions for the removal of other Superior Court Justices (in articles 146(3) and 146(4) reveals an omission in the plain language of article 146(6) relating to the impeachment process of the Chief Justice which, in my view, could not have been intended by the framers of the Constitution.....The purpose of article 146(6) is to enable credible allegations as to the Chief Justice’s stated misbehaviour, incompetence or infirmity of body or mind (see article 146(1) to be investigated....”
The Chief Justice is, from the foregoing decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, a Superior Court Justice by virtue of Article 146(1) (3) and (4) to whom the provisions of a prior determination of a prima facie case is also applicable under Article 146(6). The Agyei Twum decision is instructive on the premises that it underscores the fact that the grounds for the removal of a Justice of the Superior Court is the same as those of the Chief Justice making the omission of the requirement of a prior determination of a prima facie case a logical gap or inadvertent mistake in article 146(6) which the Supreme Court corrected by interpretation.
Unlike Articles 44 and 45 of the First Republican Constitution, 1960 which provided for separate and distinct provisions for the removal of the Chief Justice qua Chief Justice, and a Justice of the Superior Court, Article 146 of the Fourth Republican Constitution, 1992, provides one general removal provision in article 146 (1) applicable to all Justices of the Superior Court including the Chief Justice by the use of the operative words “other than the Chief Justice or a Chairman of a Regional Tribunal...” in clause 3 thereof. It will be the height of absurdity to suggest that a Chief Justice whose grounds for invoking his removal process are the same as those of “other Justices of the Superior Court” retains his position as a Justice of the Superior Court after his removal from office as Chief Justice by the President under Article 146(9) of the Constitution. Article 127(5) thereof prohibits the President from varying her conditions of service as Chief Justice to her disadvantage by her retention as a Justice of the Superior Court.
The second issue that arose for determination in Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey as I have stated hereinbefore was whether the administrative acts of the Chief Justice are immune from the impeachment process. The Court in arriving at a conclusive decision on this issue drew an analogy between the administrative responsibilities of other Justices of the Superior Court and those of the Chief Justice: the Court opined as follows:
“I think that the plaintiff’s argument on this issue is founded on the fallacy that a Chief Justice’s conduct in the administration of the Judiciary can never ever be construed as “stated misbehaviour” or “incompetence” within the meaning of article 146(1) of the Constitution. Other Justices of the Superior Courts also have administrative responsibilities, such as the supervising High Court Judges, or Judges representing the Judiciary on the General Legal Council. I believe that it would be dangerous and not in the public interest to uphold a proposition in relation to all such Judges that their administrative acts cannot ever be the substance of a charge of “stated misbehaviour” within the meaning of article 146(1).”
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court as captured by the main and leading judgment with which the other justices concurred answered the question as follows:
“As far as the Chief Justice is concerned, I think it is reasonable to link his conduct of his administrative responsibility with his position as a Justice of all the Superior Courts. Justices of the Superior Courts are required to adhere by certain ethics which can be infringed by the conduct of a Chief Justice in the performance of administrative acts. It is therefore unacceptable to exclude, a priori, all administrative acts of the Chief Justice from scrutiny as possible evidence of stated misbehaviour in his capacity as a Justice of the Superior Courts.”
The main judgment concluded by stating that:
“In sum, I would say that the administrative acts of a Chief Justice are not immune from challenge in an impeachment process. Furthermore, the establishment by the President of a committee, pursuant to article 146(6), to investigate allegations of misconduct founded on administrative acts would not constitute unconstitutional interference with the judiciary. Such a case must, however, surmount the prima facie case hurdle, before the President may lawfully establish the committee.”
The foregoing examination and analysis of the Supreme Court’s binding ruling in Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey has demonstrated conclusively that like any Justice of the Superior Court, a Chief Justice who is removed from office on any of the grounds stated in Article 146(1) of the Constitution for “stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on grounds of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind” cannot retain or claim to retain his position as a “demoted” Justice of the Superior Court. Consequently, the removal of the Chief Justice pursuant to Articles 146(1) (3) (6) (7) (8) and (9) is coterminous with the removal of the Chief Justice as a Justice of the Superior Court under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution. Article 127(5) expressly prohibits this as well. The decision in the Agyei Twum case is consistent with the analogous provisions under Article II, Sections 2 and 4 on the appointment and impeachment, and Article III Section 1 on the tenure of judges, including the Chief Justice which apply to all Federal Judges under the United States Constitution.
The provision on the appointment and removal of the Chief Justice and a Justice of the Superior Court under Articles 144 and 146 of the Fourth Republic Constitution, 1992, is different and distinct from those under Articles 44 and 45 of the First Republican Constitution, 1960. Under Article 44 of the 1960 Constitution the President was empowered to appoint one of the Judges of the Supreme Court to be Chief Justice, who would be President of the Supreme Court and Head of the Judicial Service. The President had the power at any time to revoke the appointment of a Judge as Chief Justice. The entrenched provision of Article 45, however, gave the President power to appoint Judges of the superior courts but secured their tenure of office under clause 3 thereof by providing that:
“(3) Subject to the following provisions of this Article, no person shall be removed from office as a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Judge of the High Court except by the President in pursuance of a resolution of the National Assembly supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament and passed on the grounds of stated misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mind.”
Consequently, when Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah was relieved of his post retroactively from 11 September 1963 after he presided over the three member Special Court which included Supreme Court Justices Van Lare and Edward Akufo-Addo that gave the judgment in the treason trial on 9 December 1963 he became one of the ordinary judges of the Supreme Court. Sir Arku Korsah tendered his resignation on 11 December 1963. Justice Van Lare retired a couple of weeks after the Chief Justice. Justice Edward Akufo-Addo remained on the Supreme Court. Even though the Government had more than the two-thirds of the Members of Parliament to remove him it refrained from doing so until the Constitution was amended in 1964 pursuant to a referendum when he was not reappointed to the new Court.
Edward Akufo Addo became a beneficiary of the 24 February 1966 National Liberation Council (NLC) coup d’etat which overthrew the First Republican Constitution, 1960 when after the judicial system was reorganized on 1 October 1966 with structural and personnel changes he was appointed the Chief Justice to replace Chief Justice Sarkodee-Addo. Mr. Edward Akufo-Addo was reported to have “been privately consulted from time to time by the Chairman of the NLC on legal matters and had only recently been appointed Chairman of the Political Committee of the NLC, a position he had to relinquish on becoming Chief Justice.” Chief Justice Akufo-Addo was also subsequently concurrently appointed as Chairman of the Constitutional Commission on 18 November 1966 by decree of even date. He stayed on as Chief Justice through out the military regime of the NLC into the regime of the Second Republic until resigning his office to assume the Office of President of Ghana under the 1969 Constitution with his compatriot and friend Kofi Abrefa Busia as the Prime Minister. Karma caught up with the authors and instigators of the 24 February 1966 coup when on 13 January 1972 the Second Republican Constitution met the same fate as the First Republican Constitution while Edward Akufo-Addo was still the President of Ghana. As for former Chief Justice Sir Arku Korsah, the consideration by the NLC to reinstate him as Chief Justice did not materialize. Sir Korsah was appointed by the NLC as an envoy to lead a delegation to explain to some African Countries the necessity for the 1966 coup d’état against constitutional democracy. The rhymes of history must guide what is happening today!
Sir Arku Korsah and Edward Akufo-Addo were lawyers of great distinction, learning, and involved in the political struggle as such lawyers for the liberation of Ghana from colonial rule who had made their mark as Justices of the Superior Court of Ghana. Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo on the other hand has left no comparable distinction, and learning, to the best of my abilities researching the Ghana Law Reports either as a lawyer or a Justice of the Superior Court during her tenure on the Superior Court, including as Chief Justice. In an article I published before she was approved by Parliament for appointment by President Nana Akufo-Addo as the Chief Justice of Ghana, I warned about her competence and comportment to be Chief Justice from the available Justices of the Supreme Court. Mrs Torkornoo’s abysmal tenure as Chief Justice and a Justice of the Supreme Court vindicates my views about her after the submission of the petitions for her removal from Office to her removal from office on 1 September 2025 by the President who had no option under the Constitution than to do so.
I have been watching developments since the petitions for the removal of the then Chief Justice Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo were submitted to the President and became public knowledge. I arrived at the conclusion from my considered researches that the simple petitions for the removal of the Chief Justice were being politicized by the political party that appointed her as Chief Justice as part of the political process of attacking the governing political party no matter the eventual merits of the petitions after exhausting the constitutionally mandated process. The only outcome acceptable to the appointing political party and now political party in opposition was to leave their appointee alone no matter the outcome of the constitutional process.
The role played by surrogates of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the former Chief Justice herself including raising issues about the regretful murder of her uncle, Major (Rtd) Sam Acquah, during the regime of the PNDC as a basis of objection to the venue for the hearing of her petition left no doubt in my mind that a simple constitutional issue was being turned into a political contest that could endanger the security of the state. I shudder to contemplate the likely political motives behind her actions and what end game she and her supporters have in mind by raising needles political tensions in the country.
Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo was removed upon the recommendations of a properly constituted committee under Article 146 (6) of the Constitution after several failed legal actions in the courts of justice. The Petitioner in the petition that led to her removal, Mr. Daniel Ofori, is no less a person than a citizen of Ghana who by his personal standing within the Ghanaian socio-economic system over years of self-achievement is not a person who would bring a petition as a surrogate of any person, group or government. Both Mrs. Torkornoo and her surrogates have been unable to prove that the petition pursuant to which she was removed as Chief Justice and a Justice of the Supreme Court was politically motivated.
Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo and her political supporters, however, think that they can resort to lawfare in the courts to keep the political tension in the country running high with application to the courts on matters that have been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court of Ghana in Agyei Twum v Attorney-General and Akwetey. Mrs Torkornoo and her surrogates would have gone to the Supreme Court for interpretation if they took the considered view that there was any ambiguity, absurdity, or dispute on the meaning of Article 146 of the Constitution in respect of her removal from office as Chief Justice and a Justice of the Supreme Court. Her interest appears to me to be to prolong by politicizing her removal through the process of lawfare in the hope that she can reap benefits, including the continued use of the title Her Ladyship Justice Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo.
It is not surprising to me that a number of Mr. Pendulums are swinging from ingratiating themselves into the favours of the President and the governing political party, and simultaneously into the favours of the opposition political party that appointed her with recommendation for Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo to be allowed by President John Mahama to resign from the Supreme Court or as a Justice of the Superior Court after her removal from office under Article 146(6) of the 1992 Constitution without supporting their arguments with credible legal evidence or compelling arguments of commonsense as distinct from empty rhetorical politico-legal emotional ones.
The foregoing examination of the application of Mrs. Gertrude Araaba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo to the High Court for judicial review along side the Supreme Court decision in Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey based on Article 146 of the Constitution, and the comparison with the provisions of Articles 44 and 45 of the 1960 Constitution under which Sir Arku Korsah was removed as Chief Justice of Ghana shows that the removal of the former Chief Justice on 1 September 2025 as the Chief Justice and Justice of the Supreme Court was within the powers entrusted to the President under the 1992 Constitution.
President Mahama, nominate a new Chief Justice for approval by Parliament without any further delay while your Attorney-General gets the frivolous, vexatious, and abusive application of the court process by Mrs. Torkornoo thrown out of court soonest in the interest of national security and the supremacy of the 1992 Constitution. Ghana First!
Martin A. B. K. Amidu
22 September 2025.